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On 10 June 1991, as many as one million New Yorkers set aside jobs, school, and whatever else
would have occupied them on an ordinary Monday, and crowded into Manhattan to line a
twenty-block stretch of lower Broadway’s so-called ‘Canyon of Heroes.’  Tens of thousands
more took up positions in windows and on rooftops, while millions tuned in on televisions across
the United States.  This impressive audience had assembled to watch a parade.  They had been
promised no garden-variety cavalcade, but a New York City ‘ticker-tape parade’ of the sort
previously held in reverence of Charles Lindbergh, the Apollo astronauts, and Nelson Mandela. 
This time the honour was to be bestowed upon the legions which, only a few months earlier, had
routed Saddam Hussein’s forces, driving them out of Kuwait and pursuing them deep inside the
borders of Iraq itself.  The parade’s three Grand Marshals — US Secretary of Defense Dick
Cheney and Generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwartzkopf — were followed by a column of
more than 20,000 marchers.  The mammoth procession, which took fully five and one half hours
to pass, was composed primarily of American veterans of the Gulf and other wars, but also
included small representative detachments from seventeen Coalition countries.
For some weeks prior, New York Mayor David Dinkins had, without hyperbole,
described the event as “the mother of all parades.”1  By the appointed day, the city’s post-war
effort, dubbed “Operation Welcome Home,” had actually been underway for a period nearly
twice the duration of the war itself, preparations having exceeded the time taken to prosecute the
43-day war by some 41 days.  Still, given the daunting logistics involved in the organization and
performance of a parade of this magnitude, such a lengthy preparation and deployment period
was by no means unreasonable.  Just over two months was needed for eight antique stock tickers,
working around the clock, to spit out the more than 200 miles of ticker-tape which was dropped
on marchers and spectators amidst 12,000 pounds of falling confetti.2  Decoration of the parade
route took a full week and, with five days to go and leaving nothing to chance, a final systems
check was made with a test drop of confetti from the seventeenth floor of the already flag-draped
Woolworth Building.3  Time was also needed to plan and choreograph the 30-minute fireworks
display which capped off the day’s festivities.  In all, the New York fête cost $4.7 million —
money which was raised, in part, by selling space for corporate logo advertising on the
decorative banners which lined the parade route.
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The New York parade most assuredly was not a trifling affair.  Nor was it entirely
unique.  Even as the procession got underway from Battery Park, municipal politicians in
Washington were calling on the federal government to pay compensation for damage done to
city streets by the treads of tanks which had taken part in a military parade held in the capital two
days earlier.4  Similar, albeit less extravagant, events were held in other cities and towns across
the United States as local heroes returned home from the Gulf.  And expressions of American
triumphalism were not confined to the pomp and pageantry of grand marches past reviewing
stands: commemorative items of all sorts were widely available in stores and figured
prominently among the wares of large direct marketing firms as readily as among those of a
proliferation of street vendors.  The selection of regalia was extensive, ranging from T-shirts,
baseball caps, and bumper stickers to glossy-covered picture books and professionally edited
videotapes pitching the glory and rightness of the war with an artful conceit that Madison
Avenue could hardly have bested.  Epitomizing the savvy co-optation of elements of Americana
to serve as vehicles for the official narrative of the war, Gulf War trading cards were offered for
sale in corner stores across the country.
Edward Said notes that “high technology and clever public relations were used to make
the war seem exciting, clean, and virtuous.”5  He further suggests, with Chomsky, that, in
general, the media perform a vital function in the “manufacturing of consent”6 — that is, in
generating the requisite sense of both natural necessity and moral imperative by which extreme
measures are legitimized. Still, the importance of less sophisticated technologies — like parades
and trading cards — should not be underestimated.  Just as the former may propose and provide,
ready for consumption and internalization, packages of what it may be deemed necessary to
think, believe, and ‘know’ about the war and its context, the latter furnish the appropriate and
complementary feelings and sentiments.  Mark Sussman argues that the post-Gulf War festivities
in New York, having been staged in an age when ticker-tape was already long obsolete, forged
an unambiguous sentimental link between the Gulf War and past deeds which are almost
universally regarded as just and heroic inasmuch as it “awakened nostalgia for the welcoming-
home gestures following World War II.”7
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By way of contrast with the extravagant fanfare which attended the end of the Gulf War,
the revered Lakota holy man, Nicholas Black Elk, in interviews conducted between 1931 and
1947, described as rather more subdued the observances which followed upon wars in which his
people had been involved.  These remembrances are corroborated by accounts from other Lakota
sources, such as those of Luther Standing Bear, who, like Black Elk, had lived into early
adulthood in the era of Lakota suzerainty vis-à-vis the US Army and before the traditional
lifeways of the Plains peoples were forcibly suppressed by the United States in the latter part of
the nineteenth century.  The pre-reservation Lakota, the Teton division of the Dakota people,
were the real-life embodiment and quintessence of the archetypal Plains Indian, distorted images
of which have long been a staple of Euroamerican popular culture.8  That the customs and
folkways of the Lakota should have so strongly influenced the homogenized popular image of
the ‘Indian’ in general is likely the result of having been among the last of the indigenous nations
embedded in the territory claimed by the United States to be ‘subdued.’  The infamous 1890
massacre at Wounded Knee Creek, in which nearly 300 Lakotas of Spotted Elk’s band were
killed by the US Army’s 7th Cavalry, is generally regarded as having marked the final episode in
the ‘taming’ of  the American West.9  At any rate, the Lakota had already figured prominently in
the collective imagination of Euroamerican society at least since the defeat of General George
Armstrong Custer’s attacking 7th Cavalry at the Greasy Grass — better known as the Little Big
Horn — in June of 1876.
Standing Bear’s description of the dances which were held upon the return home of a
Lakota war party gives us a glimpse into a highly ritualized event wherein the roles and even the
costumes of the participants were determined according to their individual fortunes in combat
and the manner in which the battle had been played out.10  And although there was certainly an
element of celebration involved, one does not get a sense of anything approaching the
triumphalism of a ticker-tape parade.  Of course, it is to be expected that the scale of the Lakota
and Euroamerican observances would be very different if only because the scale of the societies
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and of the wars under consideration is so different.  But the function of the post-war events also
differs greatly from one society to the other, and this requires explanation.  Ultimately, as we
shall see, the difference is founded in divergent worldviews arising from radically different
cosmological commitments.
In a footnote to the published version of his 1947 interviews with Black Elk, Joseph Epes
Brown notes that it was customary for Lakota warriors to paint their faces black as a part of the
ceremonies held in the aftermath of a battle, and attributes to Black Elk the explanation that the
practice was an attempt by these individuals to hide their faces from the higher power that orders
the universe and thereby to escape culpability in what they knew were misdeeds.11  Julian Rice,
however, offers good reason to suspect that, given its strong overtones of a Christian morality
which is fundamentally incompatible with the rudiments of a traditional Lakota worldview and
lifeways, this explanation may more plausibly be the product both of Black Elk’s striving to
“make Lakota culture expressive of the same truths as Christianity” and Brown’s efforts to show
“Lakota symbolism to be as profound as that of the ‘great world religions.’”12  In Rice’s view,
this was part of an attempt by Black Elk “to make survival conditions for Lakota consciousness
and self esteem favorable in an overwhelmingly Christian world.”13  Some preliminary support
for this position is to be found in the texts of two earlier interviews conducted by John G.
Neihardt in 1931 and 1944 respectively.  While Black Elk describes the blackening of faces in
both of these earlier interviews, he makes no allusion in either instance to an explicit association
between warfare and questions of morality.14  And although Standing Bear makes no specific
mention of this particular practice at all, it may at least be read as a telling metaphor for a
particular understanding of war, as well as of its proper social function and context, which
derives from a distinct Lakota worldview.  It will be argued here that the blackening of faces was
a symbolic expression of the imperative for the literal transformation of individuals so as to suit
their transition from one social context to another.
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It is in seeking to draw out the essential functional differences between the blackened
faces of the Lakota warriors and the ticker-tape parades of the Euroamerican ones that we
encounter some important implications for security studies.  As R.B.J. Walker has observed,
what is at stake for adherents to mainstream theoretical approaches to security studies is,
fundamentally, “the constitutive account of the political that has made the prevailing accounts of
security seem so plausible.”15  Imperiled in any contestation of the appropriateness of the state as
the referent object of security, then, are deeply-held commitments with regard to the possibilities
of political order itself — possibilities which are presumed to begin and end with the state. 
Thus, Michael C. Williams and Keith Krause propose that this is “perhaps the central reason
why the orthodoxy of security studies has been so resistant to taking account of current
transformative trends (usually by denying their relevance) that seem to challenge its analytical
assumptions.”16  If what is most jealously guarded in traditional conceptions of security is, as
Williams and Krause put it, “not simply a claim about the historical centrality of the state” but “a
particular understanding about how the state resolves the problem of political order itself,”17 then
an array of traditional Native North American knowledges and lifeways are doubly at odds with
the orthodoxy of security studies: not only do they (re)present alternative — that is, non-state —
possibilities of political order, but the denials of such possibilities which persist in mainstream
constructions of their collective identity have been essential to state-building in the Western
Hemisphere.  Moreover, many of the same assumptions which underpin the orthodoxy of
security studies and its more fundamental political commitments may be found at the root of
traditional anthropological and historiographical claims about Native North Americans which
cast their pre-Columbian condition in terms of a Hobbesian state of nature.  It is therefore
instructive to consider some of these accounts and to assess both the integrity of the evidence
upon which they rest and the extent to which they can or cannot be reconciled with the
traditional worldviews and lifeways of the peoples to which they refer.  Finally, the insights
garnered from this exercise will be brought to bear in support of the proposition that the
mainstream theoretical approaches to security studies are themselves implicated in the ongoing
maintenance and reproduction of advanced colonialism.
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But before proceeding, an important caveat must be advanced.  In attempting to draw
insights from a traditional Lakota worldview and lifeways, it is necessary to make certain
cognitive leaps across epistemological boundaries and to take seriously culturally-specific ways
of knowing.18  There is an inherent danger in this which involves the possibility of succumbing
to the pretension that one who has no lived experience rooted in Lakota culture can
unproblematically appropriate the voice of a Lakota person.  Accordingly, a sincere effort has
been made herein to hear and to take seriously Lakota voices on their own terms.  Still,
notwithstanding this self-conscious resolve, none of what follows should rightly be regarded as
anything more authoritative than a considered set of interpretations.  Of course, there are good
and well-established grounds upon which to argue that this should always be the case when one
approaches a subject matter with which they do not share a thorough and intimate lived
experience.  Nevertheless, the point is one which it is particularly important to underscore in this
instance, given the long history of spurious accounts of aboriginal people(s) which have issued
forth from ostensible ‘authorities’ and the nefarious political purposes to which they have
sometimes been turned.  Finally, it must be emphasized that, while the analysis which follows
draws on a particular tradition which is distinctly Lakota, not all Lakota people would freely
associate themselves with this tradition.  Like any other people, the Lakota nation is not
monolithic and we must take care not to contribute to the vast store of existing essentialized
caricatures of Native North Americans, whether they intone images of either the ignoble or noble
savage.
Aboriginal Peoples and the State(ments) of Nature
Michael Dorris has observed that learning about and from Native North American cultures and
histories is rather different from acquiring knowledge in other fields because the researcher
seldom ever proceeds from a conceptual tabula rasa.19  That is to say, there is a great deal which
must be unlearned before serious and productive investigation can begin.  This is perhaps
nowhere better illustrated than in the corpus of literature purporting to elucidate the functions
and conduct of warfare in traditional indigenous societies.  It is difficult to decide whether the
historians have followed the anthropologists in their work on this subject, or vice versa.  Either
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way, despite the apparent predisposition on the part of many scholars working in these and other
fields to present their conclusions as matters of objective fact, backed up by the (supposed)
rigours of Western ‘science,’ discerning the pre-Columbian condition of indigenous peoples is
not at all a straightforward and unproblematic undertaking.  As Dorris points out, “[i]t depends
on the imperfect evidence of archaeology; the barely-disguised, self-focused testimony of
traders, missionaries, and soldiers, all of whom had their own axes to grind and viewed native
peoples through a narrow scope; and, last and most suspect of all, common sense.”20 
Significantly, traditional indigenous sources are seldom ever consulted, their exclusion typically
justified on the grounds that the oral literatures characteristic of so many Native societies are less
reliable than written forms.  Consequently, the body of scholarship on the histories of indigenous
peoples has been largely self-referential, continually reproducing whatever errors of perception
and assumption as may derive, per Dorris’ reproof, from the application of a generally
ethnocentric “common sense.”
Convincingly demonstrating this point is an article by military historian John Keegan
which comes as the most recent product of his investigations into the history of warfare on the
Plains, and in which he seems not to have consulted, let alone taken seriously, Native sources.21 
He does, however, appear to have been quite adept in the application of a decidedly Western
brand of ‘common sense’ in his analysis of the putative ‘facts’ of indigenous warfare on the
Plains.  Central to this widely accredited wisdom is the familiar Hobbesian impulse which,
finding in the aboriginal condition nothing akin to the state as a means by which political order
might be furnished, posits a perpetual state of war and insecurity in its stead.  Here Keegan finds
himself in distinguished — if notorious — company: Hobbes himself maintained as evidence of
the plausibility of his idea of the state of nature that “the savage people in many places of
America . . . live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before.”22  While Keegan does not
explicitly articulate this assumption, it is implicit in, for example, his assertion that Custer and
his 7th Cavalry were “wiped away in an outburst of native American ferocity” while their
intended Lakota and Cheyenne victims are described as having been motivated less by the
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pressing need to defend their encampment from the attacking soldiers than by their own
“ferocious emotions.”23
In this and other respects, Keegan shows himself as apparently unable to imagine that
certain characteristics and conceptual commitments of the society of which he is a part and
product may not be generalizable to the whole of humanity.  Similarly, and perhaps partly in
consequence of his prior assumption of unrestrained savagery, he ascribes an entrenched and
pervasive individualism to the people of the Plains.  Indeed, the Hobbesian overtones of his work
are complemented by his characterization of the lifeways of the Plains people(s) as “rigorously
masculine and individualistic.”24  Keegan attempts to back up this position by way of reducing
the Sun Dance — a protracted ceremony in which individuals undergo considerable personal
suffering as a mode of self-sacrifice on behalf of the whole of their people and as a means by
which to gain spiritual enlightenment — to a contest between participants motivated by nothing
more than the selfish desire by each to “demonstrate in public his powers of endurance.”25 
According to Howard L. Harrod, “sun dances and other ritual processes provided occasions for
individuals to endure the suffering that was requisite for religious experience.”26  Keegan,
however, sees, as the only functional outcome of this most sacred of rituals, the participants’
acquisition of “qualities of physical hardness, contempt for pain and privation, and disregard of
danger to life that both disgusted and awed the white soldiers who fought them.”27  Thus, he
participates in the rendering of Native people(s) as unreal, constructing them at what might be
termed the super-subhuman nexus.
Keegan is by no means alone in citing individualized motives as the basis of indigenous
warfare.  Anthony McGinnis shares this perspective, arguing that “[i]n war, the tribe was
important only insofar as it supported the individual warrior and his combat and in the fact that
the tribe’s noncombatants . . . needed to be defended.”28  Emphasizing this point, he makes a
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comparison with a French officer, Pierre de la Verendrye, who was wounded at the Battle of
Malplaquet in 1709: “Fortunate enough to recover from his wounds, Verendrye returned home to
Canada, having willingly shed his blood for God, King Louis XIV, and France, something the
Indians of the northern plains would not have understood — sacrifice for an ideal or a leader
rather than for oneself.”29  Individuals in Plains societies, according to McGinnis, were prompted
into warfare only in order to obtain wealth and glory for themselves.30  Similarly, John C. Ewers
identifies opportunities for individuals “to distinguish themselves” and the pursuit of “coveted
war honors” as important determinants of warfare between Plains peoples.31
But perhaps the most extreme position as regards the presumed individualized sources of
indigenous warfare is advanced by Napoleon A. Chagnon.  Although the geographical focus of
his empirical work is situated far from the Great Plains of North America, Chagnon’s account of
the determinants of warfare among the Yanomami people of Amazonia is worth considering
here.  Central to his argument is the idea that Yanomami warfare, though sustained by a revenge
complex wherein violence by one group begets reciprocal violence in kind from its erstwhile
victims, is, at base, motivated both by competition over scarce material resources and by a
supposed biological imperative on the part of males in kinship-based groups to secure, by means
of violence if necessary, enhanced access to “reproductive resources” — i.e., women.  According
to Chagnon:
It is to be expected that individuals (or groups of closely related individuals) will
attempt to appropriate both material and reproductive resources from neighbors
whenever the probable costs are less than the benefits.  While conflicts thus
initiated need not take violent forms, they might be expected to do so when
violence on average advances individual interests.  I do not assume that humans
consciously strive to increase or maximize their inclusive fitness, but I do assume
that humans strive for goals that their cultural traditions deem as valued and
esteemed.  In many societies, achieving cultural success appears to lead to
biological (genetic) success.32
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What may be most interesting about this argument from the point of view of someone who works
primarily in the field of International Relations are the similarities which it shares, in several
particulars, with Realism.  Absent the state, it is individuals who are cast as the ‘rational gains
maximizers,’ such that the possibility of political order is effectively precluded.  Having thus
found his subjects residing in a Hobbesian state of nature, Chagnon, like Keegan, McGinnis, and
Ewers, sets about explaining the sources and conduct of their wars in terms consistent with this
condition.
If Chagnon is right and warfare in Amazonia is indeed in some significant measure a
function of genetic imperative, then it would logically follow that the apparently warlike
tendencies of the Yanomami can, with confidence, be mapped back onto their pre-Columbian
ancestors.  Furthermore, if this behaviour is biologically determined, it must be specified as a
general human characteristic.  The imposition of Hobbes’ Leviathan, then, serves to explain why
it is that the conduct of the Yanomami is peculiar and not universal to the human condition.  The
political implications of such an inference are simultaneously abstract and immediate: in the
abstract sense, it would seem to lend support to the notion of the state as the sole locus of
political order; more immediately, it confers moral approbation upon the conquest of indigenous
peoples and the suppression of their traditional lifeways, if only (at least ostensibly) to save them
from themselves.  Indeed, as Jacques Lizot points out, Brazilian newspapers supporting the
interests of resource industries which have been accused of orchestrating genocide against the
Yanomami in order to gain access to their lands have enthusiastically embraced Chagnon’s
writings.33
Here again, the Hobbesian impulse is not anomalous.  It is as readily invoked as a
justification for past conquests as for those which are ongoing.  Though he does not follow
Chagnon onto the thin ice of sociobiology, Ewers (apparently oblivious to the sum and substance
of Dorris’ warning about the questionable reliability of early Euroamerican sources) argues that
“intertribal warfare was rife [on the northern Plains] at the time these Indians first became
known to whites” and that this “is evident in the writings of the pioneer explorers.”34  And,
although he acknowledges that there is scant evidence which is suggestive of large-scale battles,
presumably with the aim of demonstrating that the possibility of large-scale exterminative
warfare was not precluded, Ewers cites the example of an 1866 battle in which “the Piegan are
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reputed to have killed more than three hundred Crow and Gros Ventres.”35  Nevertheless,
inasmuch as raiding for horses was the principal form of warfare among Plains peoples, he
submits that this is likely to have been the primary source of casualties.36  With his own motives
beginning to show, he continues: “Nor is there reason to doubt that, during the historic period,
many more Indians of this region were killed by other Indians in intertribal wars than by white
soldiers or civilians in more fully documented Indian-white warfare.”37  Having thus outlined the
rudiments of a Hobbesian state of nature as extant on the northern Plains at the earliest stages of
European contact, Ewers makes a thinly veiled attempt to rationalize the forced imposition of the
Euroamerican Leviathan, proposing that “[h]ad each of the tribes of this region continued to
stand alone, fighting all neighboring tribes, it is probable that many of the smaller tribes either
would have been exterminated, or their few survivors would have been adopted into the larger
tribes, thereby increasing the latters’ military potential.”38
Once more, then, the aboriginal condition has been presented as representative of a state
of nature, constructed in decidedly Hobbesian terms.  But what Ewers seems to miss is the
possibility that the aboriginal condition of the peoples he studies is not, in fact, known to him.  In
this too he keeps company with Keegan, McGinnis, and Chagnon.  By way of contrast, R. Brian
Ferguson raises a compelling challenge to the pretension of scholars such as these to know the
pre-Columbian lifeways of the indigenous peoples of the Americas, regardless of whether their
focus is on the conquered and colonized Plains peoples of North America or the as yet largely
unsubdued Yanomami of Amazonia.  Recent investigations by Ferguson in which he has focused
primarily on the Yanomami suggest that, contra the received wisdom of the Hobbesian impulse,
“the most general cause of known warfare in Amazonia is Western contact.”39  Although he does
not contend that warfare was unknown to pre-Columbian Amazonia, he does insist that,
“[c]ontrary to Hobbes, the intrusion of the Leviathan of the European state did not suppress a
‘war of all against all’ among Native peoples of Amazonia, but instead fomented warfare.”40 
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“Ultimately,” he continues, “wars have ended through pacification or extinction, but prior to that
the general effect of contact has been just the opposite: to intensify or engender warfare.”41 
Moreover, Ferguson holds this to be a general consequence of European imperialism virtually
wherever it has confronted non-state societies, albeit with notable local variations arising from
indigenous peculiarities.42
Ferguson attributes this phenomenon to an array of influences which fall roughly into
three broad categories, though he stresses that the latter are very much artificial and his interest
is primarily with the transformative effects of the specific qualifying factors which he groups
under them.43  The first is concerned with the purposeful incitement and/or direction of Native
warfare by Europeans.  As Ferguson notes, such practices were very common in the initial
contact period and were manifest in a variety of forms.  The most obvious and direct of these
was the use of conquered or allied Native peoples as “auxiliaries or impressed recruits” in
European campaigns against unsubjugated peoples on the peripheries of the expanding
colonies.44  In some cases, notably along the line of confrontation between the English and
French colonies of northeastern North America, Native peoples were unable to avoid becoming
entangled in wars between the colonial powers themselves.  Elsewhere, Europeans found it
expedient to facilitate — generally by the provision of arms and other goods — warfare amongst
contending groups lying beyond the pale of direct colonial authority.  Ewers, however, rejects
the idea that European contact incited Native warfare in this way and, as evidence, points to the
matter of the support which was given by Euroamericans to the Crow and Arikara in their
struggles against the Lakota:
To view the Crow and Arikara as “mercenaries” of the whites is to overlook the
long history of Indian-Indian warfare in this region.  The Crow, Arikara, and
other tribes had been fighting the Sioux for generations before they received any
effective aid from the whites.  They still suffered from Sioux aggression during
the 1860s and 1870s.  Surely the history of Indian-white warfare on the northern
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Great Plains cannot be understood without an awareness of the history of
intertribal warfare in this region.45
But, while Ewers is right in pointing out that the colonial powers, by way of exploiting existing
animosities between some Native peoples, frequently did not need to rely on coercion in
enlisting the service of Native recruits, in the end it was still these powers which enkindled
enmity into open hostilities.46
A further impetus toward the deliberate and utilitarian incitement and direction of
warfare between different Native peoples was the European demand for slaves in the early stages
of the colonization of the Americas.  As Ferguson explains it:
The initial European colonization of the New World was based on the coerced
labor of Native peoples.  Adult male captives were sought as field laborers,
women and children as domestic servants.  Royal decrees — which were often
circumvented but which still had an impact — allowed two main avenues for
enslaving Indians: taking captives in “just wars” against allegedly rebellious
Natives or putative cannibals; and “ransoming” captives held by Indians from
their own wars.  It was the latter that became the routine source of slaves. . . .
Slaving was encouraged by payments in European goods, but raiding was not
entirely optional; people who did not produce captives were commonly taken as
slaves themselves.  Slave raiding was often a constant danger even hundreds of
miles from European settlements.47
Wilma A. Dunaway draws to our attention similar conditions during the early period of contact
in southeastern North America which had a profound effect upon the nature and extent of
warfare as practiced by the Cherokee:
Prior to the development of a profitable market for war captives, slaves remained
only a by-product of conflicts waged primarily for vengeance.  Cherokee clans
frequently adopted prisoners of war to replace kinsmen who had died, or captives
could be ransomed by the enemies.  Once the traders began exchanging goods for
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war captives, the market value of the captured slaves intensified the frequency
and extent of indigenous warfare.48
Thus, peoples who may never before have been enemies, or perhaps had never even come into
direct contact with one another, developed enduring mutual malevolence.
Ferguson’s second broad category is concerned with demographic pressures arising from
European colonization and the influences which they exerted on indigenous warfare.  The
introduction of epidemic diseases against which Native people had little or no immunity was,
according to Ferguson, a source of increased hostility between groups when it led to charges of
sorcery.49  In some instances, catastrophically high rates of mortality due to disease spurred
raiding with the express purpose of acquiring captives to be integrated into the abductors’
society as a means of population replenishment.50  Of greater consequence, however, were the
migrations prompted by epidemics, slave raiding, and the ever-expanding colonies themselves. 
Migration forced direct contact between historically separated groups and increasingly brought
them into conflict as refugee groups sought to impose themselves into regions which were
already well populated.51
The third and final set of transformative influences identified by Ferguson is associated
with the introduction of Western manufactures.  Owing to the greater efficiency of steel tools
and other Western goods, such as firearms, vis-à-vis their indigenous equivalents, European
trade wares dramatically increased the war-making potential of many indigenous peoples.  These
items thus became both objects and implements of war with the deleterious effect that warfare
became a means by which to forcibly appropriate the instruments of warfare which, in turn,
made possible its expansion and the appropriation of still more of its instruments.  It is almost
certainly more than mere coincidence, then, that Native peoples who enjoyed ready access to
these goods are frequently the same ones regarded as most warlike in Euroamerican
historiographies.  Jeffrey P. Blick, for example, notes that the gun-toting mounted warriors of the
Plains owed their reputation as a warlike people largely to the historical accident of having been
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situated at the point at which the lines of trade in firearms supplied by the French in the northeast
of the continent first intersected with the diffusion of horses introduced by the Spanish in the
southwest.  As Blick puts it:
The combination of the gun and the horse . . . enabled many tribes to expand their
traditional ranges and to wage warfare in a much more efficient manner.  What
ultimately resulted was an unequal access to guns and horses.  Tribes of the Great
Plains proper were able to take advantage of the geographic continuity of the
Plains and of the rapid diffusion of the horse and gun.  Marginal tribes however,
such as the Bannock and the ‘Digger’ Indians of the Plateau and Great Basin,
were forced to retreat into inhospitable regions to avoid the raids of their mounted
predators, the Blackfoot, Piegan, Shoshone, etc.52
Thus, we see here the confluence of two broad sets of influences as the migratory pressures felt
by the Plains peoples in the face of the advancing Euroamerican colonies, combined with their
acquisition of horses and firearms, induced warfare between Native peoples, thereby setting in
motion still more waves of migration with all of the disruptive effects which that entailed.  It
must be emphasized that Blick’s position, like Ferguson’s with respect to the Yanomami, is not
that warfare was non-existent on the Plains before the introduction of Western manufactures, but
rather, that the appearance of these items was typically accompanied or followed in short order
by an increase in the frequency and intensity of warfare.
All of this makes Ewers’ above-cited admonition to take into account the history of
intertribal warfare on the Plains seem rather more problematic than it may at first appear.  It also
serves to underscore Dorris’ suggestion that the early Euroamerican accounts of the aboriginal
condition of Native peoples may be unreliable — a point which he is not alone in making.53 
Ferguson echoes Dorris’ concerns, arguing that the first accounts of contact with indigenous
peoples tended to come from “the most disruptive observers imaginable: raiders seeking slaves
or mission ‘converts’.”54  Moreover, he poses as a more general problem for anthropology itself
the fact that the first literate observers are seldom present at the time of initial contact:
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[E]thnology is built upon a paradox.  Traditionally, it has sought the Pristine Non
— non-Western, nonliterate, noncapitalist, nonstate.  Yet the quality of our
descriptions of other cultures is generally in direct proportion to the intensity of
the Western presence.  Literate observers usually arrive rather late in the
encounter.  The specter haunting anthropology is that culture patterns taken to be
pristine may actually have been transformed by Western contact.55
But, setting aside for the moment the issue of veracity and the question of timeliness, an even
more serious problem from the point of view of anyone hoping to access the aboriginal condition
of Native peoples through the accounts of observers, whether contemporary or historical, is the
fact that European influences have repeatedly preceded Europeans themselves, changing the
lived realities of Native peoples long before first contact.  This problem effectively precludes
reliance on the accounts of observers with respect to the ‘pristine’ condition of indigenous
warfare: refugee migrations, almost by definition, precede the advance of colonial frontiers;
following indigenous trade routes, manufactured goods can become commonplace in a given
locale centuries before first contact; epidemic diseases are borne by refugee flows as well as
along trade routes.  By way of example, the winter counts of the peoples of the northern Plains
indicate a very high frequency of epidemics dating back to 1714, with the first recorded outbreak
among the Oglala Lakota having taken place in 178056 — twenty-four years before they were
first visited by the renowned Euroamerican explorers Meriwether Lewis and William Clark in
1804.
So, whether our focus is on the Yanomami of Amazonia, the Cherokee of southeastern
North America, or the Lakota of the northern Plains, accounts of the supposed aboriginal
condition of Native peoples which rely to any significant extent upon what was, or may yet be,
empirically observable are highly suspect.  How, then, do we proceed?  Douglas B. Bamforth
proposes that, if “ethnohistoric documentation of warfare tells us little about precontact
circumstances,” this leaves “archaeological data central to any understanding of post-contact
changes in these circumstances.”57  Accordingly, he directs us to consider the evidence
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uncovered in the excavation of agriculturally-based pre-Columbian Native settlement sites along
the Missouri Trench in present-day North and South Dakota, with particular emphasis on one
site at Crow Creek.  As a control case, he also discusses the Larson site, an excavation of a large
former Arikara community near the Missouri River which was occupied between 1750 and 1785,
by which time the disruptive influences of the arrival of Europeans on the continent should
certainly have been keenly felt.  Bamforth notes that trenches and palisades were generally
common features of all of these sites, though the extent of their overall development and
completeness as well as the degree of attention paid to their maintenance varied across time.58 
Bamforth, probably accurately, interprets these features as defensive fortifications.  But this
assumption, in part, leads him to another rather more tenuous one: namely that large-scale
exterminative warfare was not uncommon on the northern Plains even prior to the arrival of
Europeans on the continent.
Bamforth bases this position primarily on evidence uncovered in the excavations of the
Larson and Crow Creek sites.  The latter town is estimated, according to Bamforth, to have been
built sometime in the early part of the fourteenth century.59  It was at this site that a particularly
grizzly discovery was made in 1978: a mass grave in which were interred the skeletal remains of
somewhere in the neighbourhood of 500 people.60  In addition to the fact of their having been
buried together in a mass grave, the condition of the human remains at Crow Creek indicates that
the inhabitants of the town almost certainly were the victims of a massacre.  A very high
frequency of depressed fractures to the skulls of the victims as well as other similar indications
would seem to make at least this much irrefutable.  Significantly, analysis of the skeletal remains
yielded a further insight into the tragic situation of the victims: telltale signs in the condition of
many of the long bones indicate that the townspeople had suffered from malnutrition at various
points in their lives and many of them were malnourished at the time the massacre.61  This
suggested a motive and context for the slaughter: forcible appropriation of foodstuffs during a
famine.  Bamforth compares this evidence to that found at the post-contact Larson site where a
similar massacre took place approximately four and one half centuries later, likely in
consequence, he argues, of the conflict created by mass migrations which were, in turn, a result
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of the same disruptive influences of European colonialism identified by Ferguson and Blick.62 
And finding the same sorts of osteological evidence — with the exception that indications of
malnutrition were not found at the Larson site — and similar fortifications at the two sites, he
arrives at the conclusion that “precontact tribal warfare on the northern Great Plains resulted
from indigenous cultural-ecological processes rather than from external influences.”63
As noted above, Bamforth is probably right in regarding the ditches and palisades of the
villages in the Missouri Trench as defensive fortifications.  Less clear, however, is the
conclusion that these measures were undertaken in response to endemic large-scale warfare in
the region as a feature of its various peoples’ aboriginal condition.  Yet this is precisely what
Bamforth implies when he suggests that the construction of such defences would have been a
tremendous burden for such small populations.64  To be fair, he does acknowledge that “features
which archaeologists interpret as fortifications could have primarily symbolic or ceremonial
significance . . . or . . . could have served simply as warnings which by themselves dissuaded
rival groups from resorting to all-out war.”65  Ewers, on the other hand, is considerably less
cautious: “Surely the prehistoric villagers would not have taken elaborate steps to fortify their
settlements had they not been endangered by enemies.”66  And, “[w]hoever those enemies were,”
he continues, “we can be sure that they were other Indians.”67  But can we, in fact, be so sure of
any of this?  What if the fortifications — if, indeed, they have been correctly interpreted as such
— were inspired by rumour and not by event?  The very fact that, at least in the cases of the
Larson and Crow Creek sites, they would seem to have been unequal to the purpose ascribed to
them, suggests the possibility that they were designed in response to some lesser threat.  In this
regard, it is significant that the northern Plains was noted for small-scale raiding between groups
and, especially if Bamforth is correct in assessing periods of food shortage, sedentary
agricultural communities, such as the one uncovered at Crow Creek, would have been likely
targets of such incursions.  Moreover, particularly if we accept Patricia Albers’ suggestion that
raiding, as a “mechanism for resolving short-term imbalances in the distribution of goods,” was a
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way of maintaining symbiosis between groups,68 the complete destruction of a food-producing
village would seem contrary to the interests of the raiders and, therefore, unlikely to have been a
common enterprise.  Of course, none of this is intended to suggest that any of these explanations
necessarily represent more accurate portrayals of the reality of pre-Columbian existence on the
northern Plains than those proposed by Bamforth and Ewers.  On the contrary, the point here is
only to make clear that the archaeological evidence cannot speak to us as unproblematically as
Ewers and, to a lesser degree Bamforth, would have us believe.
Bamforth’s argument leaves room for a range of conclusions other than those at which he
arrives.  We may note, for instance, that while he is able to draw our attention to a number of
sites along the Missouri Trench, just two bear evidence of large-scale exterminative warfare, and
only one of these dates to pre-Columbian times.  He does indicate two additional sites at which
partially-constructed settlements appear to have been abandoned before completion,69 but his
interpretation of this as evidence that the would-be inhabitants had been driven off by force,
though a plausible enough explanation, is hardly conclusive.  Bamforth acknowledges that the
data he examines are more suited to determining the scale of warfare than its frequency, even as
he concedes that the fortification of settlements became more common after the arrival of
Europeans.70  One wonders, then, on what basis the Crow Creek massacre should be regarded as
anything more than an aberration under conditions which, like the influences set forth from
European colonization, were disruptive of the customary lifeways of the peoples concerned. 
Finally, Bamforth himself draws attention to evidence of famine at the time of the Crow Creek
massacre as well as episodically in the years prior.  Surely this must be regarded as an extreme
circumstance which, though it may well have resulted in a massacre, is in no way indicative of a
general trend.  In fact, the evidence cited by Bamforth would seem to bespeak precisely the
opposite inasmuch as the earlier periods of malnutrition which are also indicated did not result in
a similarly catastrophic conflict.
If the archaeological evidence is rendered suspect in consequence of being susceptible of
a variety of incompatible interpretations — and this certainly seems to be the case — then we are
returned to our earlier problem of whence to proceed.  The answer proposed here is simply that
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the validity of an account of any aspect of the aboriginal condition of a given people must be
judged in light of the sociopolitical, cultural, and cosmological contexts of that people, and not
those of the observer.  Therefore, while it has been useful to discuss the disruptive influences and
effects of the arrival of the Leviathan in a more inclusive way, deliberating upon the shared — or
at least similar — experiences of a great many indigenous peoples throughout the Americas, it is
appropriate to return now to a more focused consideration of the Lakota and to assess the degree
to which various accounts of their warfare are or are not consistent with a traditional Lakota
worldview and lifeways.  Interrogating the evidence in this manner, it will be argued, yields not
only an account of the nature and conduct of Lakota warfare which is quite different from those
put forth by the anthropological orthodoxy, but also an alternative conception and practice of
political order which is equally at odds with that which is so doggedly adhered to by the
orthodoxy of security studies.
Changing Cosmological Lenses: An (Alter)Native Worldview and Lifeways
In his response to Chagnon, Lizot draws attention to the serious consequences which may arise
from attempts to make literal translations of core indigenous concepts, dragging them across the
cosmological divide that separates the worldviews of different peoples.  Noting that Chagnon
translates the Yanomami word waitheri as “fierce,”71 Lizot counters that such a simple and direct
rendering of meaning is not possible.  The word is not simply descriptive of a state of being for
the Yanomami, but signifies a highly nuanced concept with a broad spectrum of meaning which
includes, simultaneously, courage, gallantry, recklessness, and stoicism.72  ‘Fierce,’ according to
Lizot, “occurs only at the far edge of the spectrum of possible meanings, to describe an extreme
behavior.”73  He continues:
To be waitheri is to be courageous and stoic, to have no fear of others’
aggression, to refuse submission, to be capable of opposing the will of others, and
to stand up to them; it is also to be able to endure the greatest physical or
psychological suffering.  It is interesting to note that the two animals which, in the
eyes of the Indians, best embody waitheri behavior are the coati, for its bravery,
and the sloth, because it “does not die” — in other words, because it endures the
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most excruciating wounds; it is difficult to kill.  It is not a killer animal like the
jaguar that has been chosen to represent the waitheri ideal, but rather two other
animals and, if these animals are different, it is because the Indians recognize at
least implicitly the two poles of the semantic field covered: courage and stoicism.
. . . Perhaps it is clearer now why intimidation cannot constitute the basis of
Yanomami social relations: submission is contrary to [Yanomami] morality; it is
dishonorable.74
Seen in this light, Chagnon’s choice of “fierce” as the sole translation for a sophisticated concept
denoting conduct regarded by the Yanomami as virtuous is a serious distortion not only of the
idea itself but of the comportment and lifeways of this people more generally.  In this sense, it
stands as a warning with respect to the very serious implications of tearing this or that aspect of a
given people’s lived experience and worldview from its proper context and subjecting it to the
deforming constraints and impositions of a foreign epistemology.  Thus, as we move to consider
more fully the worldview and lifeways of the Lakota it is imperative that we avoid the mistake of
constructing that which may seem nominally familiar in terms of what we might imagine to be
correlates in our own lived experience.  In short, we must endeavour to take Lakota voices,
ideas, and perspectives seriously on their own terms and in their appropriate cosmological
contexts.
We are confronted with such perils almost immediately as we turn to Lakota accounts of
the nature and conduct of their warfare.  Neither Black Elk nor Standing Bear advance any claim
to anything akin to a tradition of non-violence among Lakota and neighbouring peoples on the
Plains in pre-Columbian times.  Nevertheless, Standing Bear maintains that, contrary to the
image of them advanced by scholars like Ewers, Keegan, and McGinnis, the Lakota were not
warlike:
Contrary to much that has been written, warfare with the Lakota was not a tribal
profession.  They did not fight to gain territory nor to conquer another people. 
Neither did they fight to subject other tribes to slavery.  They never kept captives
nor exacted tribute from those subdued, and there was no institution that remotely
resembled a prison.  As a matter of fact, the philosophical ideal of the Lakota was
harmony, and the most powerful symbol was that of peace.  So powerful was this
symbol that the wise men or chiefs had but to present it to the warriors and they
obeyed its mandates, no matter how reluctant they might be.75
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And while Standing Bear indicates that the revenge complex was active on the Plains, he
suggests that revenge was an infrequent determinant of warfare as compared with incidents
arising from incursions by rival groups into areas understood to be the exclusive preserve of the
Lakota.76  Of central concern was the prevention of buffalo hunts by rivals in Lakota territory
(this is a very significant point and one to which we will return in the next section).
It might be tempting to interpret what Standing Bear says here as paradigmatic of what
some might take to be, after the manner of Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”
thesis,77 a general characteristic — even a law — of the human condition: that human groupings
tend toward chauvinism, individuals therein more readily exhibiting affinities toward those with
whom they most closely identify.  Ewers goes even further, asserting that “[t]he roots of
intertribal warfare in this region can be found in the very nature of tribalism itself — the
common disposition of the members of each tribe to regard their tribe as ‘the people,’ and to
look upon outsiders with suspicion.”78  McGinnis concurs in this, implying that the very fact of a
strong sense of self identity among peoples of the northern Plains occasioned hostility toward
outgroups.79  This, however, is wholly inconsistent with the rudimentary precepts of a traditional
Lakota worldview deriving from a cosmology which is inherently resistant to the construction of
orders of hierarchy.
Standing Bear notes that, although the pre-reservation Lakota depended completely on
hunting for their survival, they never killed simply for sport.  As he explains it, this can be
attributed to a fundamental belief that all creatures have the “right to live and to increase.”80 
Robert Bunge furnishes an excellent example of the centrality of this notion in Lakota ethics,
pointing out that it was common practice when taking seeds from the burrow of a mouse in order
to flavour soup to leave behind some morsel of food for the mouse as payment.  As Bunge puts
it: “Even a mouse must live; it cannot be deprived of its means of life without payment in
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kind.”81  Similarly, Rice observes that the appropriate emotion following on a successful hunt
was not one of triumph or jubilation, but pity.82  This was consistent with the absence of a belief,
pace the Euroamerican perspective, in the superiority of humans over other animals — or plants
for that matter.  In fact, according to Bunge, precisely the opposite view was held: if anything it
was humans who were regarded as inferior, relying as they did for their survival on other species
which not only did not need them but which fared better without them.83  This regard for other
living things was expressed best in the conceptual ascendancy of the circle over linear
expressions of existence, the latter lending itself more readily to the construction of hierarchy. 
And lest this proposition be dismissed as romanticism, it should be noted that such respect was
not completely unpragmatic from a Lakota point of view inasmuch as their own well-being was
reckoned as inextricably tied to that of all others.
The importance of the circle in Lakota cosmology is considerable.  As one Lakota
informant, Tyon, explained to J.R. Walker:
The Oglala believe the circle to be sacred because the Great Spirit caused
everything in nature to be round except stone.  Stone is the implement of
destruction.  The sun and the sky, the earth and the moon are round like a shield,
though the sky is deep like a bowl.  Everything that breathes is round like the
body of a man.  Everything that grows from the ground is round like the stem of a
tree.  Since the Great Spirit has caused everything to be round mankind should
look upon the circle as sacred for it is the symbol of all things in nature except
stone.  It is also the symbol of the circle that marks the edge of the world and
therefore of the four winds that travel there.  Consequently, it is also the symbol
of a year.  The day, the night, and the moon go in a circle above the sky. 
Therefore the circle is a symbol of these divisions of time and hence the symbol
of all time.84
This account by Tyon bears unmistakable overtones of the Lakota sense of the intrinsic
relatedness of all things.  Moreover, as Black Elk makes clear, the power which sustains life
flows directly from one’s connection to this circle of relatedness, a connection which is upheld,
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in part, via literal expressions of the circle in everyday life: “You will notice that everything the
Indian does is in a circle.  Everything they do is the power from the sacred hoop . . .  The power
won’t work in anything but circles.”85  Tyon concurs in this, citing it as the reason why the
Lakota lived in round tipis which they arranged in a circle.86  And just as the power and unity
inherent in the circle is important to the well-being of individuals, so too is it crucial to the health
of the nation.  The sacred hoop of the nation is a metaphor, derived from the camp circle, for the
holistic unity of the Lakota people.  Like the tipis which make up the camp circle, the nation is
seen in terms of a hoop wherein no one constituent part is logically or implicitly prior to any
other and such that all are equally necessary to complete the unity of the circle.  The significance
of the circle, then, is rooted in the assumption of an essential continuity from individual, through
nation, to all elements of the cosmos, and back again.  In fact, no one of these can be separated
out from the others, since together they constitute a single totality encompassing all of Creation. 
Nature, therefore, is not something which must be overcome, with the result that the accent is on
harmony over struggle; as Bunge stresses, emphasis is placed on adjusting to nature, not
subduing it.87  In keeping with the endless unity of the circle, all things in the universe simply
exist in a balance which was fixed soon after their creation.88  Adjusting to this balance ensures
its maintenance and, by extension, the security of all in Creation.  Contra the Judeo-Christian
heritage, the Lakota were never cast out of their Eden; on the contrary, they are inseparable from
it.
The assumption of the fundamental interrelatedness of all things is expressed in the
Lakota maxim, mitakuye oyasin — usually, if somewhat imperfectly, translated as “all are my
relatives” or “we are all related.”  Mitakuye oyasin is in no way regarded as a normative
proposition, but as a statement of simple fact whose falsity is so completely unthinkable that it
may rightly be regarded as an aspect of Lakota ‘common sense.’  According to Fritz Detwiler,
from this perspective, simply by virtue of their being part of the sacred hoop of the cosmos, “all
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beings are related in a way that reflects the ontological oneness of creation.”89  As Detwiler
explains it:
The Oglala understand that all beings and spirits are persons in the fullest sense of
that term: they share inherent worth, integrity, sentience, conscience, power, will,
voice, and especially the ability to enter into relationships.  Humans, or ‘two-
leggeds’ are only one type of person.  Humans share their world with Wakan and
non-human persons, including human persons, stone persons, four-legged
persons, winged-persons, crawling persons, standing persons (plants and trees),
fish-persons, among others.  These persons have both ontological and moral
significance.  The category person applies to anything that has being, and who is
therefore capable of relating.90
From this perspective, given the emphasis on adjusting to — as opposed to subduing — nature,
and inasmuch as other peoples are, like the Lakota themselves, related parts of a supremely
holistic cosmos, seeking to subdue them in warfare would be inconsistent with Lakota
cosmological commitments.  Moreover, it would be self-destructive since it would fragment the
sacred hoop upon which all life depends.  Mitakuye oyasin, then, expresses not only the
interrelatedness, but also the interdependence of all elements of Creation.
It is interesting in this context to note part of a question posed by Simon Dalby: “[C]an
security be rethought in terms that do not necessarily equate difference with threat . . .?”91  We
may also wonder whether it need be that the identification of difference so conceived must
proceed to an instrumentally denigrating process of ‘Othering.’  Dalby argues that the common
assumption that Western modes of sociopolitical organization are superior to other forms and
ought to be universally embraced is fundamental to the rendering of difference as threat.92  By
way of contrast, Laurie Anne Whitt argues that “as an ethical and cognitive virtue” in many
Native societies, wherein it “mediates not only human, but human/nonhuman relationships,” the
notion of respect operates such that, “since everyone and everything has important functions,
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they deserve to be respected for what and how they are.”93  And this outlook derives, in no
insignificant way, from the ontological assumption not only of epistemological diversity, but of
cosmological diversity as well.  Accordingly, as Harrod explains:
Even though there were religious interchanges among groups, Native American
peoples were not motivated to convert others, because they did not believe that
one religion was true while the other was less true or even false.  Evangelism and
conversion were not the point of these religions.  Indeed, to offer the power of
one’s central religious rituals to another was viewed as dangerous since such
activity might cause a diminished relation of one’s group to life-giving powers.94
Similarly, according to Vine Deloria, Jr.:
No demand existed . . . for the people to go into the world and inform or instruct
other people in the rituals and beliefs of the tribe.  The people were supposed to
follow their own teachings and assume that other people would follow their
teachings.  These instructions were rigorously followed and consequently there
was never an instance of a tribe making war on another tribe because of religious
differences.95
It should be noted also that if, as Deloria maintains, no wars were fought over “religious
differences,” this would almost certainly mean that divergent lifeways would not have been a
source of derision either given that, as with most Native societies, spirituality for the Lakota was
not ontologically separable from any other aspect of life or existence, however mundane.  In this
regard, the absence in most Native languages of any pre-contact word by which to indicate
‘religion’ or ‘spirituality’ as discreet spheres is particularly telling.96  Thus, while difference
would not, in and of itself, have been constructed as threat from a traditional Lakota perspective,
owing to the commitment to a transcendent unity inherent in the sacred hoop of the cosmos,
threat might rightly be cast as difference.
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This broad outlook, which wrought no impetus to enforce conformity of others to one’s
own will or ways, was also reflected in the political structures of decision-making authority
characteristic of Lakota bands.  A band’s council was called to convene whenever (and only as)
needed to fulfill its legislative function.  Although formal membership was restricted by way of
invitation, anyone was free to speak in the council.  Consistent in some ways with the principles
of ancient Athenian democracy, all decisions were required to be products of consensus rather
than majority vote — so long as consensus could not be reached on a given question or issue, no
decision could be rendered.  This was fundamental to the Lakota conception of authority
expressed as Oyate ta woecun, translated by Standing Bear as “Done by the people” or “The
decision of the Nation.”97  Although a form of executive authority did come to prevail in matters
of immediate urgency — such as when the band was under attack — it was completely specific
to and coterminus with the special conditions which called it into being in the first place.  The
akicita, for example, performed a nominal and transitory policing function during buffalo hunts
and were invested with considerable powers of censure in ensuring that the hunt remained a
coordinated effort and that no individual did anything which might jeopardize its success.  Still,
even in this temporary form, authority was not automatically vested in any one designated
individual or group, but was deferred to those most adept at dealing with the particular concern
at hand.98  All of this is not to say that the Lakota were without identifiable leaders.  Individual
bands were nominally led by itancan — symbolic patriarchs who could attain their positions
only by way of positive attributes of character, earning them the respect and admiration of the
band.  Though they held a place of honour in council, the itancan were not possessed of any
independent decision-making authority which could be made binding upon their bands or any
individual members thereof.  To the extent, then, that they could ever presume to speak on behalf
of their people, it would have to be on matters where collective decisions had already been
reached in council.  Moreover, the status of the itancan, contingent as it was on the reverence of
their people, was subject to swift revocation should they attempt to exceed their authority or
otherwise fail to adhere to high standards of character.99
Perhaps more highly valued than any other virtue or disposition of character was the
willingness on the part of individuals to place themselves in harm’s way if necessary for the
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good of the band.  Accordingly, Lakota men, in particular,100 were importuned to comport
themselves in the manner of the buffalo bull.  It was the unswerving habit of these animals to
turn and face any predator in defence of the rest of the herd — a people in the fullest sense, from
the perspective of the Lakota.  And this was regarded as the ideal behaviour of the individual
Lakota vision-seeker: to make the transition to warrior when the need presented itself and to set
the welfare of the whole of the people as first priority.101  These individuals, then, contrary to the
orthodox accounts reviewed above, were vision-seekers first and warriors second; Standing Bear
tells us that each, “[r]ather than putting all his ingenuity to work on the refining of warfare . . .
was exerting his finer energies toward getting closer to the inner secrets of nature . . .”102  In this
regard, John A. Grim emphasizes that “[t]he somatic deprivation during vision fasting . . . as well
as the piercing during the Sun Dances, are spiritual acts which are directly tied to specific
functional cosmologies.”103  Moreover, such acts of self-sacrifice, which Keegan sees fit to
reduce to individualized expressions of bravado, were undertaken in pursuit of a vision by way
of which it would become possible to live up to the buffalo ideal.104  As Rice puts it:
While conflict and pain must be known, the ability to endure them depends on
remembering the buffalo virtues at the centre.  The survival of warriors or
visionaries in violent motion outside the camp circle depends on remembering
one’s family at the centre.  For young men this must become natural.  At first one
may be tempted to see only honors for oneself, to look outward at the enemy more
than inward toward the circle, to forget everything but personal glory . . .  In the
sense that buffalo bulls put the safety of the herd before their own, the purpose of
the sun dance, its attendant rites, and other ceremonies is to make people into
buffalo in that they become animated by the buffalo spirit.105
But if vision-seekers were to become warriors in moments of danger, it was necessary for them
to undergo profound transformations of demeanor as befit the situation.  And as Rice argues,
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what may have been regarded as virtuous conduct when the band was in need of protection
would have had destructive consequences if brought back within the camp circle.106  A literal
transformation into and back out of the role of the warrior was therefore requisite.  Just as the
buffalo bull generally behaves as any other member of the herd, exhibiting the qualities of
bravery and measured truculence only in the event of danger and never inwardly toward the
herd, the Lakota warrior was expected to step easily from one social context to the next.  The
blackening of the faces of returning warriors described by Black Elk, then, may be read as a
symbolic expression of this imperative transformation.
In an interview conducted in 1931, Black Elk recounted the story of Crow Nose, a Lakota
vision-seeker cum warrior who awoke to discover an enemy who had made his way into his
band’s camp.  Crow Nose, acting like a buffalo bull, killed the intruder, whereupon he painted
his own face black.107  In another interview thirteen years later, Black Elk, discussing the
conventions of a Lakota war party returning victorious from battle, explained that they would
stop to blacken their faces with charcoal before re-entering their own camp.108  But he also noted
an exception to the practice:
There is a rule that if a war party goes out and one or two were killed, the
members of the party do not blacken their faces.  They can have a victory dance
anyway, but when the people see the unblackened faces, they know someone was
killed, and the mourners get ready.  As a rule the mourners keep on mourning as
long as there is no revenge.  If there was someone in the tribe who had been
mourning since the last war party when some relative was killed, they blacken
their faces and rejoice when a war party comes back and has made a kill —
revenge.109
This would seem to lend support to the proposition that the practice of blackening faces was a
symbolic expression of the transformation out of the state of being associated with the warrior in
order to facilitate the transition of the individual from the outer sphere of warfare to the inner
sphere of the camp circle.  Given the existence of the revenge complex, it is interesting to note
that when members of the war party were lost in battle the returning warriors did not stop to
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blacken their faces before returning home.  In a culture wherein symbolic observances were
treated with great importance, we may surmise that this was indicative of a sense that all
obligations in the outer realm had not yet been resolved — i.e., slain comrades remained to be
avenged — and that the responsibilities of the warriors, in their role as warriors, had, therefore,
still to be fulfilled.  This would also be consistent with the account of erstwhile mourners
blackening their own faces upon the return of a war party which had killed an enemy: their
revenge burden having thus been satisfied, the conditions were met for their own transformation
of demeanor and accompanying transition back into a social context defined by a re-established
atmosphere of peace.
Rethinking the Nature and Determinants of Lakota Warfare
Clearly, the orthodox anthropological and historiographical accounts of Lakota warfare,
exemplified in the work of Ewers, Keegan, and McGinnis, are inconsistent with the realities of a
traditional Lakota cosmology, worldview, and lifeways as outlined above.  And yet, there is no
denying that warfare was a part of the pre-reservation lived experience of the Plains peoples. 
Moreover, even if, as we have seen, the Euroamerican Leviathan instrumentally exacerbated
tensions between traditional enemies, inflaming them into open warfare where this might not
otherwise have resulted, the fact remains that these enmities existed to be exploited in the first
place.  Richard White stresses that Lakota groups almost never went to war against other Dakota
peoples.110  Conversely, as Standing Bear makes clear, there most certainly were outgroups
which were unambiguously identifiable to the Lakota as enduring enemies.111  And, although
there is no evidence to suggest that any Plains people ever undertook to decisively eradicate or
even forcibly subdue an adversary population, we are nonetheless challenged to suggest a more
satisfactory explanation for inter-group malevolence than the conventional claims that this or
that group is the ‘hereditary enemy’ of some other.  As White rightly objects, this simplistic
construction is set forth as though “each group were doled out an allotted number of adversaries
at creation with whom they battled mindlessly through eternity.”112  What this underdeveloped
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explanation lacks, then, is a viable hypothesis as to from whom or what such ‘inheritances’ may
have been received.
As we have seen, the orthodox attribution of warfare on the Plains to a combination of
the anarchic environment of a (presumed) Hobbesian state of nature with the (again, presumed)
insufficiency of indigenous forms of sociopolitical organization as means by which to furnish
political order, rests on highly contestable evidentiary terrain and, more problematically, is not
reconcilable with a traditional Lakota worldview and lifeways.  However, a plausible alternative
account is proposed by Thomas Biolsi, who stresses the centrality of ecological factors as
determinants of abiding animosities between certain Plains peoples.  Biolsi, Like Ferguson and
Blick, attributes Plains warfare, in part, to the disruptive effects of the arrival of Europeans in
North America.  But while he highlights the pernicious effects produced by mass migration in
particular, he sees them as a necessary but not a sufficient cause of war.  “The point is not,”
according to Biolsi, “that these movements did not contribute to large-scale intertribal warfare,
but that some additional factor or factors were involved.”113  And he finds these factors bound up
in the imperatives of everyday survival for peoples who depended almost completely on a single
resource: the buffalo.
Biolsi’s argument is not that buffalo were in undersupply and that this ultimately gave
rise to lethal competition between contending groups.  Were this to have been the case, we might
expect that different bands among the Lakota — or among any other people of the northern
Plains for that matter — would also have developed bitter rivalries.  In any event, at least until
the depletion and eventual extermination of the herds by Euroamerican hunters in the latter part
of the nineteenth century, buffalo were plentiful enough on the Plains to provide in abundance
for the needs of the various peoples who relied upon them for their survival.  But, as White
notes, buffalo migratory patterns were unpredictable so that, despite their great numbers, they
were not always immediately available.114  A further complication, according to Biolsi, was that
once a hunt was underway, the herd would stampede, the greater endurance of the buffalo
allowing them eventually to outdistance the hunters’ horses.  In addition, there was the danger
that, even if it did not reduce the herds themselves, continuous hunting might have the effect of
permanently driving them away to safer ranges.  As Biolsi explains, this resulted in the
development of a cooperative survival strategy wherein Lakota bands, though they spent the
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winter months in separate encampments, would come together in the summer for the Sun Dance
and to take part in large communal buffalo hunts.  This allowed both for a limiting of the number
of hunts as well as the organization of a coordinated descent upon the herd by all hunters so that
each would have a chance to make a kill before the inevitable stampede began.115
All of this makes a good fit with Standing Bear’s testimony to the effect that the main
cause of warfare between the Lakota and their enemies was incursions by the latter into Lakota
territory for the purpose of hunting buffalo.116  Inasmuch as encroachments of this kind could
have jeopardized Lakota access to the buffalo, they were a potential threat to survival.  Thus, this
is also consistent with the cultural value placed on the virtues of the buffalo bull in its defence of
the herd: warriors forcibly preventing the exploitation of Lakota hunting grounds by rival groups
would have been perceived as adhering to this ideal.  Indeed, according to Standing Bear, all
other ascribed motives and incentives notwithstanding, the primary objective sought by Lakota
warriors was ensuring that the buffalo were not driven away.117  Underscoring the seriousness
which the Lakota attached to the imperative of restricting and regulating the number and conduct
of buffalo hunts is the provisional policing function performed by the akicita.  As Biolsi
observes, the institution of the akicita, whose instructions could not be disobeyed by even the
most influential itancan, “stands in marked contrast to the generally noncoercive nature of Plains
political relations.”118
All of this is suggestive of a plausible account of the origins of the seemingly intractable
states of war which existed between certain Plains peoples and which gave rise to their
characterization as ‘hereditary enemies.’  In Biolsi’s view:
Although states of war had particular histories and developmental cycles, we can
speculate about events initiating such relations.  Migration was an historical
factor that could initiate competition, warfare, and social disjunction because
tribes with no previous contact with each other would have been unlikely to
consolidate for hunting without a more or less purposeful alliance.  Initial contact
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would thus have been as separate camps, interfering with hunting and resulting in
competition and warfare.119
And given that the advent of European colonialism in North America set off hitherto
unprecedented mass migrations of indigenous populations, we may reasonably conclude that a
great many ‘traditional’ enmities were forged not out of the aboriginal conditions of the peoples
concerned, but as a function of the arrival of the Leviathan.  Biolsi finds support for this view in
the oral historiography of the Cheyenne who first came in contact with the Assiniboine in the
manner described above at a time when the latter were already possessed of firearms.  A battle
ensued and the Cheyenne, never having encountered such weapons, suffered devastating losses. 
Biolsi notes that as a consequence, “[t]he Cheyenne and the Assiniboine became traditional
enemies.”120  We thus find in Biolsi’s argument an account of indigenous warfare on the Plains
which, while it is consistent with a traditional Lakota worldview and lifeways as well as with the
testimony from a variety of Native sources, also does not conflict with the archaeological
evidence introduced by Bamforth even if it does stand in opposition to his interpretations of it.
Conclusion: Two Orthodoxies, One Perspective
Returning finally to a consideration of the different functions respectively fulfilled by the
Euroamerican ticker-tape parades and the blackened faces of Lakota warriors, the most basic
determinant of difference between the two can be located in the standards and processes by
which each society is able to legitimize warfare.  For each, this is, at some level, a function of
establishing that its own conduct has been just.  In this context, the post-Gulf ticker-tape parade
in New York was just one brief scene in a much longer enactment of an allegoric tale which
constructed the righteousness of American involvement in the war for consumption by those
Americans who had no immediate stake in it themselves.  In fact, as Sussman argues, the
medium of festival serves the additional function of manufacturing a sense of shared experience
to the extent that “[s]pectators display their belonging to society, to the nation, and to a version
of history in elaborate costumes, accessories, and signs.”121  For the pre-reservation Lakota,
however, such performances were wholly unnecessary: given the confluence of consensus-
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oriented decision-making, a worldview conditioned by a cosmology positing transcendent unity
and mandating respect and reciprocity, and the social imperative of behaving like the buffalo, the
possibility of unjust war was effectively precluded.  This is not to say that a victory in war would
not have been a happy occasion worthy of celebration — the point is simply that any such
observances as may have taken place were not performed in order to confer legitimation.
In the realm of political possibilities, the key essential difference between Lakota and
Euroamerican societies is that, for the Lakota, domination and subordination for the purpose of
maintaining political order takes place within the individual instead of being imposed from
without by the Leviathan. It is for this reason that the akicita can rightly be regarded as
anomalous.  This is highlighted by the practice of blackening faces, implicit in which is the
imperative that, upon returning to the camp circle, the virtues appropriate to the outer sphere of
warfare be suppressed after the manner of the buffalo bull.  That is to say, the role of the warrior
must be shed in deference to that of the vision-seeker.  To the extent that there was a domain in
which order had to be maintained, then, it was the responsibility of each individual over
themselves.  But order on a level transcendent of individuals was not something to be sought
after, constructed, or imposed by humans.  On the contrary, order, by this view, was inherent in
the sacred hoop of the cosmos, as reflected in the treatment of nature as the paragon to which
human behaviour was to adjust rather than as an empty wild to be subdued and turned to
instrumental human purposes.  Thus, politics was less a pursuit dedicated to the attainment of the
‘good life’ than a reverential process designed to ensure that the band did nothing which might
upset the balance of the natural order and thereby cause the already extant good life to slip away.
This clearly raises a challenge to the account of political order which undergirds the
orthodox theoretical approaches to security studies.  Interestingly, the orthodoxy of historical
anthropology is similarly contested here.  Noteworthy also is the fact that the conventional
mainstream interpretations of indigenous warfare outlined herein are ontologically consistent
with the orthodoxy of security studies and with the Realist tradition in International Relations
more generally.  Perhaps the most fundamental point of convergence between these two
orthodoxies, one which is closely tied to the association of the state with political order, is in
their shared commitment to the notion of a Hobbesian state of nature.  Though not always
explicitly articulated, it is found lurking somewhere beneath the surface in each of the several
mainstream accounts considered above.  And this points up and underscores the profound
ethnocentrism of the theoretical mainstream of security studies inasmuch as it converges so
neatly with that of historical anthropology.  After all, here we find two groups of scholars whose
only salient connection in the context of what is discussed here is a shared position in
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sociopolitical time and space.  Moreover, this disciplinary divide is itself underscored by the
almost complete inattention paid by International Relations scholars to indigenous peoples.
Given the shared assumptions of these two bodies of scholars, it should be of more than
passing interest here that the widely accepted accounts characterizing the aboriginal condition of
Native peoples as mired in interminable warfare are not, as may have been imagined, founded on
unambiguous evidence unmediated by subjective interpretation.  Those working in the orthodox
theoretical traditions of security studies would thus do well to consider the implications for their
own field of the very weak foundation upon which the conventional conceptions of indigenous
warfare have been constructed.  True enough, there does seem to be some evidence of
catastrophic, exterminative conflict between Plains peoples, as suggested by the archaeological
record.  But even leaving aside all questions relating to the manner in which this evidence has
been interpreted, it is scant at most.  And, in a field wherein many scholars have found it
appropriate to describe the Cold War as a ‘long peace,’ its many attendant wars and the
overriding nuclear threat notwithstanding, it would be strange indeed if it were now to be
strenuously argued that the relics of a few archaeological excavations which may, at best,
establish that, under extreme conditions, exterminative warfare occurred in highly localized
fashion once in every several centuries constitutes evidence that warfare was generally endemic.
Finally, it is worth noting that an important part of any colonial project is the remaking of
the colonized to suit the colonizer’s preferred — and often requisite — image of them.  In this
regard, the enduring image of the savage in the state of nature has considerable instrumental
utility, not only in cases such as the ongoing plight of the Yanomami or in the exoneration of
past conquests on the northern Plains, but in the continued colonial domination of conquered
Native peoples throughout the Americas and elsewhere.  To the extent that the mainstream
theoretical approaches to security studies — and to International Relations more generally —
exclude Native knowledges and lifeways in deference to the familiar Hobbesian impulse, they
are inseparable from the more comprehensive processes of invalidation by which the colonial
subjugation of Native people(s) is sustained.  Though not directly culpable as purposeful agents,
scholars working in this tradition, like their counterparts in the orthodoxy of historical
anthropology, are nonetheless implicated in the ongoing project of advanced colonialism. 
Furthermore, if, as has been argued herein, the commitments by which the denial of Native
knowledges is justified do not stand up to critical scrutiny, we are left with the unsatisfactory
circumstance that these selfsame commitments, by orienting the interpretation of ambiguous
evidence, are themselves the source of whatever putative proof can be invoked to support them. 
One may thus be forgiven for taking pause to wonder whether a frequent enough repetition of an
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unsubstantiated idea can, in some instances, actually serve to make it true.  By extension, the
final paradox is that the invisibility of indigenous peoples from the perspective of adherents to
the orthodoxy of security studies is in some measure reproduced by the failure of these same
scholars to see them.  Unlike that conveyed by the Lakota vision-seeker/warriors returning to
their band with blackened faces, then, the message for security studies would seem to be that a
matter of considerable importance urgently awaits resolution.
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